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Abstract  
Corporate fraud committed under climate mitigation pressures is becoming more frequently 
observed in line with the ever increasing environmental standards and relevant regulation 
enforcements. One example is the Volkswagen Emission Gate Scandal. Using firm-level 
panel data of major automobile manufacturers from 2000 to 2015, this study empirically 
identifies the motives behind the corporate deception scandal. We develop a conceptual 
model summarising the factors  affecting decision-making, and the firms’ environmentally 
responsible investments (ERIs) including  the truthfulness of related public communications.  
Our findings identify legal and regulatory pressures, the firm’s existing level of ERIs 
competency and expertise, pressures from emission regulation, market competitors, 
consumers, owners, or shareholders as the key factors inducing the scandal. The empirical 
findings show that firms are more likely to experience corporate fraud if their senior 
managers are paid with substantial variable components that may lead them to engage in 
riskier business behaviour and to be more short-term focused, thereby supporting the well-
established contract theory. To avoid corporate fraud and engage in legitimate business 
competitiveness, we suggest that firms should focus on technological innovation as well as 
improving corporate governance and leverage ratios to effectively control and monitor 
management. In addition, policy makers should be more realistic about practical and 
commercial limitations in the policy-setting process, and take on a more supporting role in 
achieving technological innovations and effective corporate governance. In summary, we 
argue that cleaner production is not only the result of technologically progress and research, 
but importantly it also involves issues associated with corporate governance and business 
ethics.  
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1. Introduction 
The growing concern about the causes and consequences of climate change has impacted on 
business practices and consumption behaviours world-wide. To maintain long-term 
sustainable business developments, firms are motivated to invest heavily in research and 
development, in the effort to improve technological progress, and to minimize their energy 
consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. Consumers are more willing to buy, and pay a 
premium for, products whose values are anchored to environmental conservation 
(Gatersleben et al., 2002; Pickett-Baker and Ozaki, 2008). Thus the green marketing strategy 
has become a popular approach for firms in their commercial promotions. A green marketing 
strategy will inevitably lead to a significant positive impact on the firms’ sales revenue, 
profitability and market performance. Consequently, firms are encouraged to conduct their 
business activities by engaging in cleaner production processes.  
The literature shows that technological progress plays a critical role in cleaner production 
activities (Li and Xue, 2016; Cheng et al. 2017). However, the notion is challenged by the 
uncovering of corporate fraud in environmental statistics. In 2015, Volkswagen (VW) Auto 
Group was found to falsify the test records of selected air pollutants by up to 40% (Reuters, 
2015). Other automobile manufacturers, including Mitsubishi Motors and Suzuki Motors are 
also involved in test scandals in which they were found to have manipulated fuel economy 
data in 2016 (CNBC, 2016). This resulted in worldwide investigations of corporate fraud 
specifically addressing environmental data within the automotive manufacturing industry. 
The originality of this study lies in its investigation of the integrity of the automobile industry 
in relation to environmental standards, which to date has not been investigated. This study 
identifies several important and under-researched issues correlated to factors affecting the 
decision-making, and the firms’ environmentally responsible investments (ERIs) in the 
automobile industry. We review a series of determining factors that affect the decision-
making relating to ERIs among automobile makers. Then we extend our investigation to 
major car makers by empirically identifying the motives behind their deception. The US 
automobile market, being one of the largest reputable and mature automobile markets, is 
selected for our study. The research questions underpinning this study are: 
• What are the key factors that affect the environmental investment decision of 
automobile manufacturers? 
• What are the factors that underpin a deception scandal in the automobile industry? 
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• What are the factors that can prevent environmental related corporate deception? 
Understanding these questions is important as the climate risk is an increasing concern for 
everyone on this planet because the effect of climate change could be irreversible and costly 
(Li and Xue, 2016). Consequently, many countries have introduced a series of environmental 
policies to transfer the current economic development model to a low carbon economic 
model with desirable economic growth. In theory, the business sector has no choice but to 
comply with the environment policies. Realistically, a business corporation needs to balance 
the potential cost and benefits associated with the compliance to environment policies. 
However, the literature in this area is scarce thus our study addresses this oversight by 
developing a conceptual model identifying the factors affecting the investment decision of 
automobile manufacturers.  
Climate change research is classified into two categories: the causes and solutions of climate 
warming, and the effect of environmental policies on corporate performance. In recent years, 
climate change has attracted researchers’ attention from multiple disciplines which produces 
a significant amount of research outputs.  For example, climate change studies can be found 
in Economics (Kwon, 2005; Lise, 2006; Andreoni and Galmarini, 2012; Meng et al. 2013; 
Zhang and Tang, 2015), Finance (Daskalakis et al. 2009; Jong et al. 2014; Oestreich and 
Tsiakas, 2015, Griffin et al. 2015), Science (Allen et al., 2009; Meinshausen et al., 2009; 
McGlade and Ekins, 2015) and the Management literature (Dowell et al. 2000; Hull and 
Rothenberg, 2008). Empirical studies employ different methodologies, use a wide variety of 
samples spanning over a number of time periods. They ask different questions directly and 
indirectly examining the causes of climate risk, and how climate risk affects the economic 
and financial performance at country, region, industry and firm level (Li and Xue, 2016). 
However, the empirical findings of previous studies are inconsistent due to methodological 
issues associated with varying definitions, the choice of variables and their measurement.  
In addition, many studies assume that the corporate sector should actively deal with climate 
risk and comply with the environment policies and regulations in an honest and truthful way. 
Unfortunately, it is observed that firms, such as the Volkswagen (VW) group, are strongly 
motivated to present themselves, or their products, to be more environmental friendly, even if 
they are not as good as they claim. It is precisely this aspect, which is largely overlooked in 
the literature. Thus this study empirically investigates the factors that underpin the deception 
in the automobile industry scandals. Understanding this is important to both regulators and 
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investors as corporate performance is directly related to investors’ interest and the long term 
economic prosperity of the society in a boarder perspective.  
The empirical findings show that corporate fraud is positively related to the variable 
component of the senior managers’ remuneration package, implying that performance based 
payment design could make managers more short term focused which might deteriorate the 
long term performance of firms. In addition, the empirical evidence shows that firms with a 
high corporate governance score and leverage ratio are negatively related to corporate fraud, 
suggesting that a good corporate governance system and the existence of external creditors do 
have monitoring power on a managers’ behaviour. We find that environmental expenditure is 
negatively associated with environmental related corporate deception, supporting the notion 
that technological progress plays a critical roles in carbon emission reduction (Zhang et al. 
2014;  Liu et al. 2015; Li and Xue, 2016).  
To attain long term sustainable communities requires changing current business production 
modes and consumption behaviours. Consequently, the cleaner production literature mainly 
focuses on sustainable business models (Bocken et al. 2014), technical progress (Fallde and 
Eklund, 2015; Cheng et al. 2017), sustainable consumption (Liu et al. 2016; Shao et al. 2017), 
corporate social responsibility (Barnett and Salomon, 2006; Ghoul et al. 2011; Wang and 
Sarkis, 2017), and sustainable products and services (Chou et al. 2015; Dyllick and Rost, 
2017; Hallstedt and Isaksson, 2017). Based on our study’s findings, we assert that corporate 
governance and business ethicality greatly influence a company’s operational decision and 
play important roles in achieving cleaner production targets. This view is overlooked in the 
literature.  As Volkswagen Chairman Hans-Dieter Pötsch confessed on December 10, 2015 
“ A group of the company’s engineers decided to cheat on emissions tests in 2005 because 
they couldn’t find a technical solution within the company’s “time frame and budget” to build 
diesel engines that would meet U.S. emissions standards”. When the engineers did find a 
solution, he stated, “they chose to keep on cheating, rather than employ it” (Goodman, 2015). 
Therefore, we argue that policy makers need to re-examine the climate policies to ensure that 
they are achievable in terms of technological progress, financial budgeting and timing. 
Furthermore, the accountability, transparency and responsibility in current corporate 
governance systems need to be further improved. 
This study contributes to the literature in four ways. First, a conceptual model is developed 
that identifies the factors affecting the firms’ ERIs decision and the success of the ERIs. The 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
5 
 
conceptual model shows that legal and regulatory pressures, the firm’s existing level of 
expertise and competency in ERIs, pressure from competitors, consumers, and owners 
/shareholders respectively are five key factors determining the a firm’s appetite for ERIs. 
While the success of the ERIs will be heavily influenced by the investment size , marketing 
timing, technological capacity, managers’ ethicality, as well as management’s appetite for 
ERIs. Second, we empirically investigate the fundamental reasons affecting corporate 
deception in the automobile industry from the corporate governance perspective. The 
empirical findings show that corporate governance quality and the senior manager’s 
remuneration structure have significant explanatory power on corporate deception. Third, 
although the cleaner production concept is well established in the literature, the effect of 
corporate governance and business ethicality on cleaner production has been overlooked. The 
empirical findings of this study assert that the importance of corporate governance and 
business ethicality should be taken into consideration and emphasized in the cleaner 
production process. Fourth and finally, we suggest that policy makers should assist firms in 
relaxing climate policy pressures by supporting their technological innovation as well as 
improving corporate governance quality so as to effectively control and monitor management 
behaviour.  
This remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section II discusses the conceptual 
model affecting the ERIs decision and the succession of ERIs. Then Section III reports the 
data and methodology. Section IV presents our empirical results and Section V draws 
conclusions and areas for future research.   
2. Developing an Environmentally Responsible Investments Model 
One of the major causes of global warming is rapid economic growth, leading to dramatic 
increases in energy consumption (Li and Xue, 2016). Fortunately, countries around the world 
are united in sharing and expressing their deep concern on this issue, including the major 
greenhouse gas emitters, such as the European Union, China and the US. Due to differences 
in economic circumstances, the approaches to, and the formulation of environmental policies 
vary greatly from country to country. Regardless of the differences across the borders, 
businesses will need to present themselves as being more environmentally friendly, even 
though it may not always be the case. 
In this study, we present a theoretical model (presented in Figure 1) that summarises the  
contributing factors impacting on the decision-making of firms’ ERIs, the success of firms’ 
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ERIs, the subsequent public announcements relating to the outcome of these projects, and the 
response to such public communications. We identify the following five key factors that can 
affect a firm’s appetite for ERIs: legal and regulatory pressures, the firm’s existing level of 
expertise and competency in ERIs, pressure from competitors in the market, pressure from 
consumers, and pressure from owners /shareholders. This model focuses on factors affecting 
the decision-making and success of ERIs or research, and the communication approaches and 
results chosen by firms. 
The business environment varies depending on the legal and regulatory environment in which 
a firm operates. In stricter regulatory environments, such as the case in developed countries, 
there is greater regulatory pressure for a firm to be more environmentally compliant. For 
example, the automobile industry is heavily regulated in relation to safety features, carbon 
emissions and fuel economy standards, which forces car makers to find a balance among road 
performance, fuel consumption and carbon emissions. Zhang et al. (2014) and Liu et al. 
(2015) conclude that technological progress is the key factor of improving environmental 
performance as well as carbon emission reduction.  Thus, any technological breakthrough is 
associated with significant economic competitive advantage. Along these lines, greater 
competency and expertise in environmental technologies will help firms further extend their 
competitive advantage. At the same time, external pressures such as markets and government 
regulations force firms to aggressively invest in higher-energy-use technology or projects, 
even if they have no experience or knowledge in the area. The activities of competitors 
present another form of pressure swaying a firm’s strategic direction. If a firm’s main 
competitors become active in ERIs, the firm will have no choice but to follow suit. A current 
example of this phenomenon in the global automobile industry is the competition in 
developing luxury electric cars. Following Tesla’s success with Model S sedan, BMW and 
Mercedes are now in a race to release electric car models (Behrmann and Rauwald, 2016).  
Customers’ preferences are influential on a firm’s commercial activities and its strategic 
decision-making. Consumers are increasingly paying attention to products with 
environmental conservation tags, due to the growing concern about climate change. 
Shareholders’ views too can weigh heavily on a firm’s decision-making. If shareholders 
strongly favour ERIs, management is tasked to oblige, and to put in place plans to achieve 
that vision. Along with factors that affect a firm’s appetite for ERIs noted above, other  
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Figure 1: Factors affecting a firm’s environmentally responsible investment decisions 
and their success   
 
                          Factors affecting a firm’s inclination to environmentally responsible investment 
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helping to solidify the integration of environmental performance targets into a firm’s 
operations (Rodrigue et al. 2013). Once a firm has made its investment decision, the success 
of the project largely depends on five key factors: market timing, the size of the investment, 
management’s appetite for ERIs, the firm’s technological capabilities, and management’s 
level of ethicality. Market timing is critical in shaping the success of commercial endeavours. 
An ERI is more likely to succeed when the relevant products are available at the right time, in 
the right place, and supplied to the right customers. The size of investments plays a role in the 
outcome of any commercial endeavour. A limited budget for investment is a common 
constraint, hindering a firm’s ability to conduct research and develop potential opportunities. 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies may generate value in the long run, by 
lowering a firm’s capital constraints through improving transparency, tightening internal 
control and reducing information asymmetry (Cheng et al. 2014).  
An increasing number of firm managers seek to create value for shareholders by being more 
eco-efficient (Figge and Hahn, 2013). Competition from peers motivates managers to focus 
on CSR, in fulfilling the desire to be industry leaders with respect to environmental efforts 
and CSR performance (Rodrigue et al. 2013). However, the technological capabilities of a 
firm are inevitably limited and predetermined, putting a ceiling on what a firm can achieve 
through its ERIs. Further investments may boost a firm’s capabilities, though this is not 
guaranteed. Given the recent discovery of emissions scandals across the automobile industry, 
it would appear that many firms have already reached their technological capacity, but have 
continued to release positive public announcements based on false information. The 
discovery of the release of false information exposes the weak corporate governance 
mechanism and low level of business ethicality in these firms.  
The management team’s level of ethicality impacts investment outcomes (Parker, 2014). For 
instance, managers in an ethical management team would be intrinsically motivated to 
achieve meaningful results from ERIs. On the other hand, if a firm’s culture encourages 
employees to cut corners or “look the other way”, there will be a higher likelihood of hidden 
underlying issues even if there are apparent successes on the surface. Irrespective of the 
outcomes of ERIs, managers prefer to release positive news to the public and omit the 
undesirable news. Even worse, some firms manipulate the data to appear positive, and the 
motivations for data manipulation are primarily driven by either pushing up stock prices or 
obtaining extra performance bonuses (Wahlen et al. 2011).  At the time of writing, in addition 
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to Volkswagen, Mitsubishi, Suzuki and Nissan have been implicated in scandals involving 
fuel efficiency testing irregularities. 
A negative market reaction is dreaded by all and can itself serve as a deterrent. Once a firm is 
caught feeding the market false information, the market will question all the information that 
firm has provided, and any information it may not have provided in order to hide other 
potential problems in the business. As a result, share prices plummet, at least in the short term. 
Business associates may distance themselves from future negotiations and collaborations. 
Banks will start providing less favourable financing terms, and owners /shareholders will 
demand change and remedial action plans. These reactions add to the pressure from the 
market and shareholders for better investments and better results from subsequent 
management decisions. In turn, management will need to be more effective and successful in 
its future endeavors, thus completing the flow in Figure 1. 
 
3.  Data and Method 
The sample used in this study consisted of 15 major global automobile makers for the period 
2000–2015, and includes 240 firm-year observations. These 15 automobile makers are all 
publicly listed companies in United States. The list of 15 automobile makers can be observed 
in Appendix 1. These are the firms that have the required data from Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4 (for CSR score), DataStream (for firm specific information) and annual report (for 
execution compensation information and ownership structure) respectively. The Thomson 
Reuters ASSET4 is a Swiss-based company which specializes in offering a company’s 
environmental, social and governance performance scores. All these data are collected by 
specially trained research analysts for each firm which can be used for quantitative analysis 
and the score can be ranged from 0 to 100.  The detailed variable definition and measurement 
can be obtained in Appendix 2.  
Table 1 presents the basic summary statistics. The average CGS is 31.302. However, it varies 
greatly across the sample firms, implying that these firms have a range of views and 
approaches towards environmental and corporate governance regulations, even though they 
all operate in the same industry. The percentage of a company’s environmental expenses to 
total sales (EES) also varies greatly across the sample, ranging from 0% to 21.098%, further 
confirming that the appetite for environmental research and investment varies significantly 
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across companies. The overall long-term LEV is 19.68% which is maintained at a very 
healthy level. The average is the variable component of directors’ remuneration package 
(VCR) ratio of our sample firms is 30.299%, ranging from 0% to 84.033%. This suggests that 
the structure of compensation packages varies greatly across the companies, which may have 
a significant impact on their operating strategies in relation to environmental research and 
investment. On average, sample firms have a bank ownership of 6.681%, ranging from 0% to 
62.71%.  As for the ownership controlled by insurance company and mutual funds, the 
sample firms have an average value of 1.680% and 1.818% respectively. In addition, on 
average the top 5 shareholders jointly control 47.633% of total outstanding shares.  
Table 1 Summary statistics for sample firms 
Variables Mean Std. deviation Min Max 
Scandal 0.2 0.4 0 1 
CGS 31.302 28.294 2.12 93.51 
LEV (%) 19.68 8.953 1.488 45.928 
ROE (%) 7.448 36.833 -252.84 281.62 
VCR (%) 30.299 29.017 0 84.033 
EES (%) 1.119 1.652 0.000 14.347 
Bank(%) 6.681 10.258 0 62.71 
Insurance(%) 1.680 4.963 0 35.62 
Mutual Fund(%) 1.818 3.712 0 16.76 
Top 5 shareholding(%) 47.633 23.076 0 100 
Notes: Scandal: dummy variable representing whether a sample company is involved in a deception scandal, 1 = yes, 0 = no; CGS: 
corporate, social and responsibility score; LEV: long-term leverage ratio; ROE: return on equity; VCR: variable component of directors’ 
remuneration package, measured by the percentage of variable component divided by the total remuneration package; EES: percentage of 
company’s environmental expenses to total sales. Bank: percentage of equity controlled by banks. Insurance: percentage of equity controlled 
by insurance companies. Mutual Fund: percentage of equity controlled by mutual funds. Top 5 shareholding: percentage of equity controlled 
by top 5 shareholders.  
We ran a firm-level probit regression with a scandal dummy variable as the dependent 
variable and firm-specific factors as explanatory variables for each sample firm in our data 
set, as follows: 
Pr (Scandal=1│x)=e^(x^' β)/(1+e^(x^' β) )=Λ(x^' β) 
Where x' β={β0+ β1CGSit+ β2 LEVit+ β3 VCRit+ β4 EESit }     (1) 
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Our basic empirical model in Equation (1) is a panel data regression. It is expected that firms 
with a high CGS, high LEV and higher EES are less likely to be associated with a deception 
scandal. In contrast, we expect that firms will be more likely to release misleading 
information to the public if their executives receive a significant proportion of variable 
compensation.  
4. Empirical Findings 
Our empirical analyses involved t-tests of mean difference, and a probit regression. The 
univariate test was conducted to test the significance of differences between firms who are 
facing a scandal and those who are not. Table 2 shows that firms experiencing scandals have 
significantly higher VCR, lower LEV and lower CGS.  
Table 2: Univariate test of key independent variables 
Variable Mean (scandal 
firms) 
Mean (non-scandal 
firms) 
T-test value 
CGS 11.691 37.089 -5.095 
LEV 12.584 21.551 -6.7827 
VCR 38.56 28.13 1.866 
 
The regression results of model (1) are presented in Table 3. In Table 3, we found that VCR 
is positively related to the scandal dummy, which is statistically significant across all models 
except model 5. This finding suggests that firms are more likely to be associated with 
scandals when executive remuneration is closely related to firm performance. Chhaochharia 
and Grinstein (2009) and Conyon (2014) argue that the variable component of executive 
compensation package, such as bonus and stock options, is basically performance related. 
Cable and Vermeulen (2016) argue that performance-based pay can hurt companies in the 
long term because variable components of payment are more focused on the firm’s current 
and short-term performance. Large bonuses and stock option plans change the behavior of 
many senior managers in that they become driven to focus on short-term gains and to take 
more risks, confirming that in many cases much higher reward levels have a detrimental 
effect on performance including creativity (Ariely et al. 2009). Of course, the duties of senior 
managers rarely involve routine tasks, and managers must be innovative and creative. Indeed, 
they must make hard decisions based on careful consideration of the directions and 
challenges facing their firm, in the context of a highly volatile business environment. Yet this 
type of job is particularly unsuited to substantial variable pay (Cable and Vermeulen, 2016). 
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       Table 3: Regression results 
Expected sign Models 
  
 
1 2 3 4 5 
C  2.186*** 2.41*** 1.048*** 2.419** 2.277** 
 
 (2.52) (3.11) (4.81) (3.08) (2.14) 
  [0.868] [0.772] [1.084] [0.786] [1.177] 
CGS (-) -0.083**  
   
    (-1.97)  
  
 
  [0.0421]     
Bank   
 
-0.068** 
  
 
    
 
(-2.04) 
   
   [0.033]    
Insurance   
  
-0.168 
  
    
  
(-1.63) 
  
    [0.103]   
Mutual funds     0.370  
     (0.78)  
     [0.473]  
Top 5 shareholding       0.007 
      (0.58) 
      [0.012] 
LEV (-) -0.108** -0.158*** -0.243*** -0.172*** -0.153*** 
    (-2.06) (-3.14) (-3.35) (-3.41) (-3.20) 
  [0.052] [0.050] [0.072] [0.050] [0.047] 
VCR (+) 0.047*** 0.311** 0.038** 0.023* 0.019 
    (2.62) (2.23) (2.04) (1.94) (1.50) 
  [0.018] [0.014] [0.018] [0.012] [0.012] 
EES (-) -0.895* -0.01 -0.001*** -0.007* -0.001 
    (-1.94) (-1.53) (-2.50) (-1.81) (-1.62) 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
Pseudo R
2
 0.4945 0.4852 0.5974 0.4484 0.3692 
Note: t-statistics are given in parentheses. Standard errors are given in square brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
In contrast, environmental research and investment are more focused on the long term, and 
rarely create competitive advantage or promote firm performance in the short term. Therefore, 
when variable pay is substantial, managers are not highly motivated to support environmental 
research or environmentally friendly projects. For example, VW’s bonus system is unusually 
generous, and it impacts all employees, from the assembly line up to the executive 
management team. The more senior the position, the more bonus there is available as part of 
one’s remuneration package. And the bonus system at VW rewards consensus. Bonuses are 
rewarded at three levels: the individual bonus, the company performance bonus, and a reward 
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for team performance. Because a substantial proportion of bonuses are tied to people around 
each employee, there is financial incentive for individuals not to criticise the company’s 
wrongdoing. We believe that the heart of the deception issue at VW is linked to the executive 
compensation scheme, and this is why none of the firm’s employees have dared to speak up. 
In addition, people are more likely to engage in misconduct or dishonest behavior when a 
large proportion of their pay is based on variable financial incentives, because they must 
balance their personal financial benefits with the company’s needs. This will lead senior 
managers to make unethical decisions – in academic terms, “extrinsic motivation causes 
people to distort the truth regarding goal attainment” (Cable and Vermeulen 2016). Many 
studies (Harris and Bromiley, 2007; Peng and Roell, 2008 ) have shown that a performance-
related payment system significantly increases the likelihood of earnings manipulations, 
shareholder lawsuits and product safety problems. Wowak et al. (2015) argue that option-
based compensation is implemented to align the interests of executives and shareholders. 
However, this performance payment design could lead to undesirable outcomes. These 
authors find that firms with CEOs on option-based compensation are more likely to have 
product safety issues.  
Our results show that, as expected, CGS and LEV are negatively associated with the scandal 
dummy, and are statistically significant across all the models. The literature shows that a 
good corporate governance system can not only protect shareholder investment, but also 
motivate professional managers or entrepreneurs to maximize the wealth of investors. 
Furthermore, it can provide investors with sufficient incentive and power to monitor and 
control management in order to achieve profit maximization (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La 
Porta et al., 2000; Bebchuk and Weisback, 2010). Therefore, firms with a high CGS are more 
likely to effectively control and monitor their managers, and thereby better avoid corporate 
fraud.  
Besides shareholders, creditors also have the power to monitor companies’ operational 
behavior (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In this regard, it is not surprising that banks are highly 
involved in and exercise a significant degree of influence and control over companies with 
which they are associated, even if they do not hold share ownership in the company. For 
example, Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) report that the cash balance of Japanese firms is 
affected by the monopoly power of banks in Japan, and is gradually reduced when the role of 
banks is weakened. Furthermore, bank-influenced firms have a better chance of obtaining 
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external capital. Therefore, it is believed that firms tend to behave more reasonably when 
they have fewer creditors (Agarwal and Elston, 2001). Thus, it is understandable that firms 
will be less likely to be associated with scandal or corporate fraud when their LEV is 
relatively high. As expected, a negative relationship between EES and the scandal dummy is 
observed, for which the explanation appears straightforward: the more environmental 
research or projects a firm invests in, the lower will be the likelihood of that firm being 
involved in an environmental scandal, supporting the notion that technology improvement is 
the most important component to environmental performance (Zhang et al. 2012). Similar 
conclusions are drawn by Qi et al. (2016). 
Besides the CGS obtained directly from the database, we also use ownership controlled by 
banks, insurance companies, mutual funds and ownership concentration ratio (ownership 
percentage held by the top 5 shareholders) to capture the monitoring power of shareholders. 
The literature shows that block holders and concentrated ownership can monitor management 
effectively to protect shareholders’ interests (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The regression 
results in Table 3 (Models 2–5) show that only bank ownership exerts a significant and 
negative influence on the scandal dummy variable, implying that firms are less likely to 
commit misconduct or dishonest behaviour when one or several banks control a significant 
proportion of the firm’s ownership.  
 
4.1 Robustness Tests 
We employed alternative ownership variables to examine the robustness of the results 
presented in Table 4. The three new ownership employed variables are: 1) bank ownership to 
top 5 shareholdings if banks are on the list of top 5 shareholders, 2) insurance company 
ownership to top 5 shareholdings if insurance companies are on the list of top 5 shareholders, 
and 3) mutual fund ownership to top 5 shareholding if mutual funds are on the list of top 5 
shareholders. As presented in Table 4, banks to top five shareholdings and insurance 
company to top 5 shareholdings are negatively related to the dependent variable. Conversely, 
mutual funds do not exert a significant influence on the sample firms’ behaviour due to the 
relatively limited size of the investment.  
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 Table 4 Robustness tests 
Expected sign Models 
  
 
1 2 3 
 
C  2.385*** 4.054*** 2.422***  
 
 (3.71) (3.76) (3.07)  
  [0.751] [1.079] [0.787]  
Bank_to top 5 shareholdings   -0.0312**  
  
  
    (-2.03)  
  
  
  [0.015]    
Insurance_to top 5 shareholdings     -0.11**  
 
  
       (-2.48) 
 
  
   [0.044]   
Mutual funds to top 5 shareholdings    0.242  
    (1.16)  
    [0.208]  
LEV (-) -0.152*** -0.243*** -0.172***  
    (-3.28) (-3.34) (-3.40)  
  [0.046] [0.072] [0.051]  
VCR (+) 0.026** 0.036** 0.024**  
    (2.11) (2.00) (1.97)  
  [0.012] [0.018] [0.012]  
EES (-) -0.001* -0.01** -0.007*  
    (-1.28) (-2.33) (-1.88)  
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]  
Pseudo R
2
 0.4589 0.5763 0.4479  
     
Note: t-statistics are given in parentheses. Standard errors are given in square brackets. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
4.2 Marginal Effects 
Marginal effects tests are conducted to further measure how a change in the independent 
variable is related to the dependent variable. Again, the empirical results of the test confirm 
that CGS, LEV, VCR and EES do have a significant impact on whether a particular firm is 
more or less likely to be associated with a scandal related to environmental standards. 
A one unit increase in CGS will produce a 1.5% decrease in the probability of scandal 
involvement for the sample firms. Similarly, a 1% increase in the long-term LEV will 
generate a 2% decrease in the probability of involvement in an environmental scandal for the 
sample firms, while a 1% increase in the EES ratio will generate a 16.31% decrease in the 
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probability of such involvement. In contrast, a 1% increase in the VCR ratio will generate a 
0.8% increase in the probability of involvement in an environmental scandal among these 
firms. Based on the empirical findings, it is fair to say that the management teams of the 
sample firms seek to find a balance between honesty and dishonesty. Figure 2 shows that the 
decisions made by the management teams eventually depend on whether they can run the 
business according to certain corporate governance and ethical standards (CGS, LEV and 
EES) or they put their personal interest ahead of such concerns (VCR). In other words, these 
decisions revolve around whether the financial incentive for senior managers is strong 
enough to persuade them to distort the truth. Based on the coefficients, we can safely 
conclude that the effective approach to preventing environmental scandals in the future would 
be to invest aggressively in environmental research or ERIs, which is consistent with the 
international literature (Meng et al., 2013; Liu et al., 2015; Li and Xue, 2016).  
Table 5 Marginal effects results 
Models 
 
1 2 3 4 
CGS -0.015** 
  
 
 
(-2.37) 
  
 
Bank_to top 5 shareholdings 
 
-0.0062** 
  
  
(-2.42) 
  
Insurance_to top 5 shareholdings 
  
-0.017*** 
 
 
  
 
(-3.31) 
 
Mutual funds to Top 5 shareholdings    0.05 
    (1.21) 
LEV -0.02** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.03*** 
 
(-2.54) (-5.60) (-6.62) (-6.23) 
VCR 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.006** 0.005** 
 
(3.97) (2.63) (2.47) (2.32) 
EES -0.163** -0.0001 -0.0001** -0.0001** 
 
(-2.30) (-1.31) (-2.79) (-2.10) 
Note: Z-statistics are given in parentheses. 
To return to the VW scandal, this deception lasted for more than 10 years, and not one VW 
employee publicly questioned the firm’s cheating behavior over that time. It is hard to believe 
that this “mistake” was entirely the fault of a group of engineers, and that the senior managers 
and other employees knew nothing about it. We argue that all VW employees – senior 
managers, in particular – chose to keep these deceptions secret from the public because of the 
pecuniary benefits of doing so. 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
17 
 
Figure 2: To Lie or not to Lie 
 
5. Conclusion  
This study provides a theoretical model of the many relevant factors that can have an impact 
on the dynamics of a firm’s ERIs decision-making, and answered the following research 
questions addressing:  ‘What are the factors that can impact on the ERI decisions?’, ‘What 
are the factors that cultivate a deception scandal in the automobile industry?’,  and ‘How can  
firms prevent environmental related corporate frauds in the future?’.  
Through the conceptual model, we have identified five key factors that significantly impact 
on a firm’s appetite for ERIs:  
(1) legal and regulatory pressure; 
(2) the firm’s existing level of expertise and competency in ERIs; 
(3) pressure from competitors in the market; 
(4) pressure from consumers; 
(5) pressure from owners /shareholders.  
We conclude that in terms of public communications, firms may choose to truthfully report 
their ERIs outcome to the public, or to deliberately hide undesirable news, even to manipulate 
data to falsely present positive ERIs results. To avoid corporate fraud and have a fair play in 
business competitiveness, we argue that in order to achieve a more environmentally 
responsible production process, we need more than technological progress and research, but 
also improved corporate governance and business ethics. Consequently, the setting and the 
implementation of environmental policies needs to be further considered and reformed. It is 
expected that technological progress will continue to play a critical role in achieving cleaner 
Not to Lie
•Active environmental expenses (EES)
•Optimal leverage ratio (LEV)
•Good corporate governance score (CGS)
•Social responsibility
To Lie
•Managers' contract with massive variable components 
and bonuses (VCR)
•Risky firm strategy & short-term goals induced by VAR
•Threat from competitive rivals
•No technical solution
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industrial production. In additional, business corporations are required to greatly improve the 
accountability and transparency of their internal corporate governance mechanisms. 
Furthermore, leadership is identified as a key driver of governance, change and innovation, 
and it is imperative to accommodate for the workers who are involved in the production 
process. 
Furthermore, we note that this is the first study to empirically investigate the factors 
underpinning the exposed deception scandals in the automobile industry over the past decade. 
Our empirical analysis is based on the ERIs model and the firm-level panel data of major 
automobile manufacturers from 2000 to 2015. The study findings provide new insights into 
how firms handle the ever-growing environmental pressure in their business operations. Our 
results indicate that the remuneration structure of the sample firms – for senior managers, in 
particular – do have a significant impact on these firms’ decisions to deceive. This 
relationship in turn influences the design of remuneration packages, including key 
performance indicators, organizational design and governance. Conversely, corporate 
governance, the leverage ratio and investment in environmental research have a significantly 
negative relationship with the likelihood of involvements in a scandal. Future studies may 
consider testing the model and its elements in the settings of other large manufacturing 
industries, as well as various service sectors. Whilst the model has integrity in the US market, 
it would be worthwhile testing it in other countries.  
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Appendix 1: List of the 15 Automobile Makers 
Number Name 
1 Bayerische Motoren Werke (BMW) Auto Group 
2 Daimler-Benz Auto Group 
3 Fiat Automobiles 
4 Ford Motor Company 
5 General Motors Company 
6 Honda Motor Company 
7 Hyundai Motor Company 
8 Kia Motor Corporation 
9 Mazda Motor Corporation 
10 Mitsubishi Motors corporation 
11 Nissan Motor Company Ltd 
12 Groupe Renault 
13 Suzuki Motor Corporation 
14 Toyota Motor Corporation 
15 Volkswagen Auto Group 
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Appendix 2: Variables Description 
Variables Definition Sources 
Scandal dummy variable 
representing whether a 
sample company is 
involved in a deception 
scandal, 1 = yes, 0 = no 
Media (Reuters, CNBC) 
CGS A sample firm’s corporate, 
social and responsibility 
score.  
Thomson Reuters 
ASSET4. 
LEV (%) Long term leverage ratio, 
measured by the 
percentage of long term 
liability divided by the 
total assets 
DataStream 
ROE (%) Return on equity, 
measured by the 
percentage of net income 
divided by the total 
shareholders’ equity 
DataStream 
VCR (%) Variable component of 
directors’ remuneration 
package, measured by the 
percentage of variable 
component to the total 
remuneration package 
DataStream 
EES (%) A company’s innovation 
score, measured by the 
percentage of company’s 
environmental expenses to 
total sales. 
DataStream 
Bank Bank ownership variable, 
measured by the fraction 
of equity controlled by 
banks  
Annual Report 
Insurance Insurance company 
ownership variable, 
measured by the fraction 
of equity controlled by 
insurance companies  
Annual Report 
Mutual Fund Mutual fund ownership 
variable, measured by the 
fraction of equity 
controlled by mutual funds  
Annual Report 
Top 5 shareholding Ownership concentration  
variable, measured by the 
fraction of equity 
controlled by the top 5 
Annual Report 
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shareholders  
Bank to Top 5 shareholdings bank ownership to top 5 
shareholdings if banks are 
on the list of top 5 
shareholders 
Annual Report 
Insurance to top 5 
shareholdings 
insurance company 
ownership to top 5 
shareholdings if insurance 
companies are on the list 
of top 5 shareholders 
Annual Report 
Mutual Fund to Top 5 
shareholdings 
mutual fund ownership to 
top 5 shareholding if 
mutual funds are on the list 
of of top 5 shareholders 
Annual Report 
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Highlights: 
 Using firm-level panel data of major automobile manufacturers from 2000 to 2015, this 
paper studies the Volkswagen emissions scandal and explore why firms lie on emission 
report. 
 We first time provide a theoretical model to analysis the factors affecting firms’ 
environmental responsible investments (ERIs) decision-making and corporate governance.  
 We find that legal and regulatory pressures, the firm’s existing level of expertise and 
competency in ERIs, pressure from competitors in the market, pressure from consumers, 
and pressure from owners /shareholders are five key factors have an impact on a firm’s 
appetite for ERIs.  
 We argue that cleaner production is not only the result of technologically progress and 
research, but also an issue of corporate governance and business ethics factors.  
 We suggest avoid the fraud and raise firms’ competitiveness by promoting technology 
progress, improving corporate governance and ensuring business ethicality. We also suggest 
the governments reform environmental policies to reduce pressures from the ever-growing 
environmental pressure in their business operations.  
 
